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The image of the bifurcation between two paths, indicating the 
uncertainty and risk of a choice between two alternative possibilities, 
was sometimes used in ancient Greek literature. Before the famous 
apologue of Heracles at the crossroads by Prodicus of Ceos (Xen. 
Mem. II.1.21-34), that image had already appeared in Homer (Od. 
XII, 55-58) and Hesiod (Op. 286-292). But the most significant 
philosophical example, standing out from the others in as much as it 
does not intend to communicate practical or ethical 
recommendations, dates back to the poem of Parmenides of Elea: in 
his fragment B2 DK the protagonist of the narration, a goddess, after 
having begun to speak, indicates to the listening kouros two ways of 
inquiry that open to thinking. The passage has been extensively 
discussed, giving rise to a conspicuous number of exegetical 
alternatives. However, roughly speaking, it can be said that the first 
of the two ways mentioned by the goddess concerns being, and is 
indicated as the path of truth, while the second concerns not being, 
and is presented as the path of ignorance. Therefore, Parmenides, 
through the mouth of the goddess, is inviting us to follow the first 
way and avoid the second one. 
It is interesting to note that in post-Parmenidean philosophy there 
have been two thinkers who seem to have wanted to go both ways, in 
one case by accepting the indication of the goddess, and in the other 
by transgressing her prohibition. They are Melissus, who followed 
the first path, and Gorgias, who instead explored the second, reason 
why Melissus, who was from Samos, was recognized as an Eleatic 
honoris causa, while Gorgias, a Sophist from Leontini, has been 
interpreted as an opponent of the Eleaticism. Things are certainly less 
simple than they appear. It is by no means certain that Melissus can 
rightfully be considered a ‘Parmenidean’, not only because some 
characteristics of the entity he speaks of are different from those 
envisaged by the alleged master of Elea (the one always remembered 
is the spatio-temporal infinity of being, apparently denied by 
Parmenides and admitted by Melissus). Melissus’ stylistic choices, 
the structure of his argument, as well as the overall vision of reality, 
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appear substantially different, and in some respects incompatible, 
with those of Parmenides. Despite all this, one fact remains 
indisputable: in his treatise – with the plausible title Περὶ φύσεως ἢ 
περὶ τοῦ ὄντος – Melissus has exposed a stringent linear deduction of 
the characters of being. Undoubtedly, he derives from it a doctrine of 
an absolute being that denies space to any other entity, and therefore 
(apparently and as most scholars interpret) also to the physical world 
in which we live: a form of strict monism which in all probability we 
do not even find in Parmenides (contrary to how it was thought in the 
past), as indicated by the absence of a section comparable to that in 
which the physical theories expounded by Parmenides are contained, 
the so-called Doxa. However, we can still say that Melissus followed, 
in his own way, the path indicated by the goddess, and although in 
this journey he deviated significantly from what Parmenides 
presumed to have found (to the point of detaching himself, perhaps, 
controversially), there is no doubt that his source of inspiration 
remains this Eleatic precedent. 
But this crossroads (and the prohibition to follow one of the two 
paths) in some way seems to have also inspired the other thinker we 
have mentioned, Gorgias. As it is well known, he was the author, in 
addition to epideictic texts, of a successful treatise with an explicitly 
anti-Melissan title, Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως, where the 
inversion and the insertion of the negation have a strong polemical 
(if not parodic) significance. Yet, following the three moments of the 
Gorgian argument, we note how its goal was to break the link 
between being, thinking and saying, which Parmenides had upheld 
precisely in B2, the fragment of the crossroads. The second way, that 
of not being – Parmenides said – is unthinkable and unsayable. 
Gorgias, on his part, says in a progression that not only nothing is, 
but that even if something were it would not be thinkable, and even 
if it were thinkable it would not be sayable. Whoever tries to walk 
Parmenides’ way of being finds three successive obstructions: if he 
overcomes the first obstacle (if only he could do it), he finds another, 
and then another again. All that remains is, paradoxically, to follow 
the path of not being, an unsettling outcome, the meaning of which 
still engages interpreters today. 
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This is the thematic core of the Archai dossier that we present here 
and in which some specialists of the two authors participate, gathered 
to contribute to understanding this ontological crossroads and to 
examine some aspects of the original alternative explorations 
conducted by Melissus and Gorgias in their respective (and in a 
certain sense specular) treatises. 
The series of articles opens with an essay by Sosseh Assaturian1 
entitled “What’s Eleatic about the Eleatic Principle?”, whose 
objective is to investigate the relevance of the ‘Eleatic’ attribute in 
the so-called ‘Eleatic Principle’: it is a tenet referred to in the 
metaphysical debate, whose first occurrence dates back to the 
Platonic Sophist (247d-e), and consists in the principle according to 
which only items that have the causal capacity to affect (or inversely 
to be affected) are. Assaturian specifies the three ways in which the 
principle is modulated in the Platonic text: as tangible contact, as a 
change in the relational properties, and as something which is 
responsible for something else’s being the way it is. After a long 
examination, she concludes that these three ways appear partially in 
Parmenides and Zeno, and in all three cases in Melissus, thus 
justifying the ‘Eleatic’ name given to this principle. Moreover, 
Assaturian reinterprets one of the most important fragments of the 
Melissan treatise, B8 DK, arguing – against the majority reading of 
the philosopher of Samos – that the characteristics of Melissan what-
is are compatible with the existence of the sensible world. 
The relationship between Melissus’ being and the physical world is 
also called into question by the presence, among the surviving 
fragments of the philosopher, of what appeared (starting from the 
same source, Simplicius) as an unequivocal attestation of the 
incorporeality of being (fragment B9 DK). It is evident that an 
infinite incorporeal being can, in a purely theoretical line, coexist 
with the material world. Mathilde Brémond2 returns to the problem 
of the correct interpretation of B9 in an article entitled “Corporeality 
 
1 See Assaturian (2020). 
2 See Brémond (2017). 
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and Thickness: Back on Melissus’ Fragment B9”. Presenting the 
status quaestionis, Brémond shows that faced with the potential 
tension between the negation of corporeality and thickness (pachos), 
on the one hand, and the affirmation of infinite greatness and fullness, 
on the other, the interpreters have assumed various positions, either 
by reinterpreting one or the other of the contradictory characters or 
by questioning the authenticity of B9, in whole or in part. Brémond 
judges all these proposals insufficient and focuses her attention on 
the concept of pachos rather than on that of the body, showing how 
thickness implies divisibility into parts. For the Presocratics, one of 
the characteristics that distinguish the soul from the body is the 
thinness of the former, understood as indivisibility: it is to this notion 
that, according to Brémond, Melissus would refer, paving the way 
towards the conceptualization of incorporeality that will occur with 
Plato. 
As we have said, an incorporeal (or quasi-incorporeal) being could – 
purely theoretically – coexist with the sensible world. If, on the other 
hand, Melissus’s being was considered as a single matter, dense and 
infinite in size, then there would be no space for the existence of the 
physical world, unless we consider it as a single substantial matter 
that underlies the different fundamental elements of things. The latter 
was the interpretation advocated by Galen (CMG V 9, 1, 17, 16) in 
the commentary on a passage from the Hippocratic treatise De natura 
hominis. Benjamin Harriman 3  dedicates his contribution entitled 
“Establishing the Logos of Melissus: A Note on Chapter 1, 
Hippocrates’ De natura hominis”, to the correct interpretation of this 
Hippocratic passage, which offers the most ancient testimony on 
Melissus. Here the author, probably Polybus, a proponent of the 
theory of the four humors (and therefore of a multiplicity of 
constituents of man), disputes the interference of philosophers in 
medical debates, in particular of monists who recognize only one 
material constituent at the base of nature (and therefore also of man). 
In doing so, however, the author argues that in some way these 
 
3 See Harriman (2018). 
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thinkers refute each other, ending up by establishing (or set right) the 
logos of Melissus. Harriman traces the main interpretations of the 
passage, showing how the argumentative strategy of Melissus is at 
stake there, rather than his monistic stance. Polybus would refer to 
the strategic use of a supplemental argument by Melissus (in B8) as 
well as by the material monists, betraying the underlying weakness 
of their theses. 
Just as the study of Melissus’ reception can help us understand his 
doctrine, in the same way Melissus himself can be understood from 
the perspective of Parmenides’ reception, which justifies his 
belonging to the so-called Eleaticism. Livio Rossetti in “Superare 
Parmenide. Zenone, Melisso e Gorgia impegnati a fare ‘meglio di 
lui’”, shows which are the points (especially of a methodological 
nature) on which Melissus tried to go beyond the results achieved by 
the master from Elea 4 . More than on a strictly doctrinal level, 
Melissus would have grasped that one of the strengths of Parmenides’ 
reflection consisted in the formal scheme underlying his argument. 
The Samian thinker would therefore have tried to surpass his master, 
meanwhile freeing himself from the poetic and imaginative means 
used by Parmenides; he would also have perfected the logical 
structure of the demonstration through better ordered arguments. But 
he was not the only one in this venture; in the agon, Rossetti also sees 
two other important post-Parmenidean thinkers involved: Zeno, to 
whom a series of valuable conceptual innovations must be 
recognized, and Gorgias, who, while following closely the 
argumentative method of Melissus, used it to deconstruct the theses 
of Parmenides, as the first cornerstone of his treatise already 
demonstrates programmatically: nothing is. 
But what does that ‘not being’ the Siceliot Sophist puts as the object 
of his reasoning consist in? In the article “What is Gorgias’ ‘not 
being’? A brief journey through the Treatise, the Apology of 
 
4 Rossetti analyses the relation between Parmenides and Melissus also in the recent 
Galgano, Giombini, Marcacci (eds.) (2020). 
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Palamedes and the Encomium of Helen”, Erminia Di Iulio5 conducts 
an investigation on the possible definition of not being in Gorgias 
through a comparison between the Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος (PTMO) and 
part of his remaining epideictic production. The PTMO shows that 
not being turns out to be contradictory inasmuch in the moment in 
which it is affirmed, it is denied as well: therefore, Gorgias 
recognizes its contradiction from a mere linguistic point of view. At 
the same time, he had also questioned the validity of attributing being 
to reality, and therefore its linguistic expression. The epideictic texts, 
however, seem to move in another direction, especially the Apology 
of Palamedes which, while on the one hand seems to consolidate the 
hypothesis that what has not happened cannot be said, on the other 
hand it establishes the impossibility of judging both what is and what 
is not: in the book, in fact, they are associated with the criterion of 
the true (what really is) and of the false (what has not occurred and 
therefore cannot be said, proved or witnessed) through the 
introduction of the concept of opinion. To a certain extent, therefore, 
the Palamedes confirms the PTMO, but at the same time it goes 
beyond the latter, establishing a new connection through the true-
false pair. The same seems to be valid for the Encomium of Helen, 
where it is stated that it is not possible to say what really happened to 
the woman, and Gorgias offers four (likely) possibilities for 
reconstructing what occurred. Di Iulio concludes that in the Gorgian 
works there remains a certain internal inconsistency regarding the 
question of not being, to the point that its univocal definition does not 
seem to be identifiable. 
In any case, the PTMO remains the text of choice for the investigation 
into not being in Gorgias. It has arrived to us in two versions, that of 
the anonymous author of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De Melisso 
Xenophane et Gorgia (MXG) and that reported by Sextus Empiricus 
in Adversus mathematicos. Marina Volf6 in “Gorgias’ revising of 
ancient epistemology: On Non-Being by Gorgias and its paraphrases” 
 
5 See Di Iulio (2020). 
6 See Volf (2014). 
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faces the issue of correspondences and divergences between these 
two versions, proposing a synoptic framework of the arguments 
developed in them and noting their considerable differences. This 
analysis leads the author to try to establish the distance between the 
Gorgian stance and the Parmenidean and Protagorean doctrine, 
understood as true ‘counterparts’ of the PTMO, also through the lens 
of contemporary linguistic theories. The conclusion to which Volf 
comes is that both versions are able to express the overall 
philosophical position of Gorgias, since they integrate each other: in 
this sense, they can be considered equally informative. 
One of the differences between the two versions of the Gorgian 
treatise is the presence in the MXG of an argument against the 
movement. In her contribution entitled “Between Eleatics and 
Atomists: Gorgias’ argument against motion”, Roberta Ioli7 focuses 
precisely on this topic. The investigation starts from the analysis of 
not being that is found in the two versions of the book, and this allows 
her to justify Sextus’s lack of transmission of the argument against 
the movement as a deliberate choice: for Sextus, indeed, such 
argument would not have been essential for his purposes, while he 
would have considered more useful to concentrate on other aspects 
of Gorgias’ argument (also, Ioli notes, for a reason of a formal nature, 
namely the respect of symmetries between the antinomies). Coming 
then to the specific analysis of the argument against the movement, 
the author remarks the connections with the deduction drawn by 
Melissus in his treatise and does not fail to highlight a fruitful link 
with the Atomists’ doctrine. Ultimately, for Ioli, Gorgias would have 
intended to show the weaknesses of both Eleaticism and Atomism, in 
line with his aptitude to analyse and deconstruct the theories of other 
thinkers, leading them to a contradiction. 
However, the ontological deconstruction in the PTMO does not fail 
to be accompanied by lateral reflections of a different nature, but 
equally functional to the Gorgian demonstration. Pilar Spangenberg8 
 
7 See Ioli (2010). 
8 See Díaz - Spangenberg (2011). 
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in her article “El paradigma de la sensibilidad y la fragmentación en 
el PTMO de Gorgias” examines the treatise from a gnoseological 
perspective, and in particular in the light of the notion of ‘knowing 
subject’. The subject appears in the work as ‘fragmented’ with 
respect to the various functions of the human senses. Gorgias does 
not outline a unified theory of knowledge, but ceases at the 
deconstructive moment: this fragmentation, however, does not 
prevent Gorgias’ analyses, refined and well set up, from being of 
extreme interest, offering an indirect contribution to the theme of 
knowledge that Plato and Aristotle will not fail to point out. Indeed, 
they will later try to reunify in the subject what the Sophist had 
broken down. 
The critical debate today seems to be oriented not only in the 
direction of a re-evaluation of the two treatises by Melissus and 
Gorgias, and their interconnection, but also in that of a rethinking of 
their function of transmission of Parmenidean doctrine (as well as 
Protagorean and Democritean, called, even tacitly, into question by 
Gorgias). 
This dossier, thus, aims to offer itself as a contribution to this debate 
by outlining an evocative and articulated historiographical 
framework, showing how this crucial moment in the post-
Parmenidean thought deserves further attention on the part of 
scholars of ancient philosophy. 
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